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Abstract:
Discrimination might be considered unjust on account of the compar-
ative disadvantage it imposes, the absolute advantage it imposes, the
disrespect it shows, or the prejudice it shows. This article argues that
each of these accounts overlooks some cases of unjust discrimination.
In response to this state of affairs we might combine two or more of
these accounts. A promising approach combines the comparative dis-
advantage and absolute disadvantage accounts.
1. Introduction
Most people agree that discrimination, understood as differential treatment of mem-
bers of racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, sexual-orientation, and disability groups
(‘groups’, for short) on the basis of their respective group memberships or associated
differences, is usually morally wrong, unjust even. But there is little consensus on the
question of why in these cases it is wrong or unjust. It is my purpose in this article to
make a modest contribution to answering that question. Most writers assume that dis-
crimination is wrong where it is wrong either on account of the comparative disadvan-
tage it imposes on discriminatees, the absolute advantage it imposes on them, the dis-
respect it shows for them, or the prejudice about them it shows. I argue that, for each
of these views, there is a kind of case which seems clearly to be an instance of wrong-
ful and unjust discrimination, but which the view does not identify as such. This sug-
gests that some combination of the above considerations is necessary for any overall
account of unjust discrimination.
My focus on the injustice of discrimination, as opposed to its wrongfulness or bad-
ness, is on account of three considerations. First, those who are concerned with com-
bating discrimination are not primarily interested in moral censure, but rather with pol-
icy. As such, it seems that discrimination’s injustice is at the fore of their concerns.
Second, the particular considerations that I advance, those of the comparative and ab-
solute disadvantages of discriminatees, are most naturally interpreted as considerations
of justice, as they rely, in their most plausible forms, on a substantive account of dis-
tributive justice. Thus, insofar as they are a basis for identifying wrongful discrimina-
tion, they will also be a basis for identifying unjust discrimination. As the conditions
1 I am grateful to an audience at the PSSA conference at the University of Cape Town in January 2012
and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on antecedents of this article. Research for this arti-
cle was supported by the British Academy and the National Research Foundation.
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for the latter are, if anything, more demanding, and as the latter is directly relevant to
policy, it is worth emphasising that the argument I present has not merely moral but
justicial implications. Finally, in spite of its more obvious relevance to policy, the in-
justice of discrimination is a neglected topic relative to its wrongfulness. Given this,
while my concern is with the injustice of discrimination, I will, of necessity, discuss
under this heading views which explicitly address only its wrongfulness. They remain
relevant as it seems clear that, while in some contexts injustices might arise in the ab-
sence of wrongdoing,2 wrongfulness is a necessary condition of unjust discrimination,
which necessarily involves acts or omissions. In other words, an account of the wrong-
fulness of discrimination is also a large part of an account the injustice of discrimination.
The article is arranged as follows. Section 2 motivates the focus of the article by
showing that what I refer to as discrimination is not always unjust, or even wrongful,
and thus that it makes sense to distinguish just from unjust discrimination. Section 3
introduces one pair of accounts of the injustice of discrimination, which say that dis-
crimination is unjust where it disadvantages discriminatees in comparative or absolute
terms. Section 4 introduces another pair of accounts of the injustice of discrimination,
which say that discrimination is unjust where it shows disrespect or prejudice towards
discriminatees. Sections 5 and 6 argue that the above four accounts of the injustice of
discrimination are each susceptible to powerful counterexamples. Section 7 notes that,
given the failure of the individual accounts, an appealing response is to combine some
of them, and offers support for a combination of the comparative disadvantage and
absolute disadvantage accounts.
2. Is discrimination necessarily unjust?
Some writers assume, as I do, that discrimination is not always wrong or unjust.3 Oth-
ers, however, use ‘discrimination’ in some stronger way such that it is necessarily
wrong or unjust.4 However, these latter writers do not usually object to ‘reverse’, ‘pos-
itive’, or ‘compensatory’ discrimination, which offers favourable treatment for mem-
bers of groups with historical and ongoing disadvantages (Nagel 1973; Dworkin 1977:
ch. 9). Rather, they place it in the different but related category usually called ‘affir-
mative action’. Thus, their disagreement with the assumption of this article that dis-
crimination is not always unjust is not a substantive disagreement, but a verbal one.
My question of ‘is this an instance of unjust discrimination, or of just discrimination?’,
is just their question of ‘is this an instance of discrimination, or of non-discrimination
(for instance, affirmative action)?’. While I will pose the question in my way in the re-
mainder of the article, I am not thereby making any contentious moral claim about the
status of discrimination itself.
Assuming this terminology, there can clearly be cases of just discrimination. Fur-
thermore, these cases are not restricted to cases of affirmative action. It might, for in-
stance, be plausibly maintained that discrimination in favour of members of certain
groups, even if these groups are and historically have been advantaged, is not itself un-
2 For instance, some ‘telic egalitarians’ believe that ‘it is unjust or unfair that some people are born less
able, or less healthy, than others’ (Parfit 1997: 208 n. 11).
3 This is suggested by the very titles of Alexander 1992; Arneson 2006; Hellman 2008.
4 Thomas E. Hill (1995: 174) defines discrimination as necessarily impermissible, while Judith Jarvis
Thomson (1973: 384) and Sophia Moreau (2010: 145) understand ‘discrimination’ in such a way as to
imply injustice. Similarly, Thomas Scanlon (2008: 74) treats discrimination as ‘unidirectional. It applies
only to actions that disadvantage a group that has been subjected to widespread denigration and exclu-
sion’.
just. Usually it is unjust because it has the effect – be it intentional or otherwise – of
discriminating against members of other groups. But in unusual cases where this ef-
fect is absent it is hard to identify any injustice.
Suppose, for instance, that you and I are marooned on a desert island. I have two co-
conuts and you have none, and there is no other source of nutrition on the island. You
happen to be a member of the same group as me, and I discriminate in favour of you
and give you one of my coconuts. Had you been a member of a different group I
would have kept my coconuts for myself. But there are actually no members of any
other group on the island, so no one is harmed by my discrimination, and you are sig-
nificantly benefitted. Even if my intentions are in some sense wrong, it is hard to iden-
tify any wrongdoing on my part in this case (at least, assuming, as we can, that I am
not to blame for my attitudes).5 There is therefore no injustice.
Those who are concerned with combating discrimination need not, then, be con-
cerned with combating discrimination per se, but rather with combating unjust dis-
crimination. As we shall see in the next two sections, people differ on exactly what it
is about unjust discrimination that makes it unjust.
3. Disadvantage accounts
Some writers hold that wrongful discrimination is wrong on account of the disadvan-
tage that is thereby imposed on the discriminatee (Lippert-Rasmussen 2006a, 2006b;
Segall 2012a, 2012b). Here, (dis)advantage should be understood as a placeholder for
whatever it is that ultimately (dis)benefits individuals. Common candidates for advan-
tage are resources, welfare, and capabilities; candidates for disadvantage are shortfalls
in these.
To see the general appeal of the view that wrongful discrimination is wrong because
it disadvantages discriminatees, it may be noted that in my earlier coconut case, no one
was discriminated against. My act of discrimination benefited someone, but harmed
nobody. The general view that says that discrimination is wrongful where it disadvan-
tages someone does not say that there is injustice where I discriminate solely in favour
of someone, as in the coconut case. That seems intuitively plausible, I would suggest.
Those who endorse this view divide into those who believe that the relevant kind of
disadvantaging is comparative – the wrong consists in the disfavoured individual(s)
becoming worse off relative to the disfavoured individual(s) than she would have been
were there no discrimination – and those who believe the relevant kind of disadvantag-
ing is absolute – the wrong consists in the disfavoured individual(s) becoming worse
off in non-comparative terms than she would have been were there no discrimination.
Call these views, applied to the question of why unjust discrimination is unjust, the
comparative disadvantage account of the injustice of discrimination and the absolute
account of the injustice of discrimination. The difference between these views is ap-
parent from the reasons they give for opposing my actions in a three-person version of
the coconut case, where, on discriminatory grounds, I decline to divide my spare coco-
nut between two other people, giving all of it to the one of them who is a member of a
group to which I belong. The comparative view says that it is unjust for the
discriminatee to be made worse off relative to the recipient of my coconut than she
would have been were she not discriminated against, i.e. discrimination has resulted in
her having one-half less of a coconut than does the recipient. The absolute view says
that it is unjust for the discriminatee to be made worse off than she would have been
S. Afr. J. Philos. 2013, 32(1) 49
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were she not discriminated against, i.e. discrimination has resulted in her having
one-half less of a coconut simpliciter.
While the two disadvantage accounts, as stated above, can cope with the coconut
cases, they seem less plausible in another kind of case. Where there is a group that has
been historically discriminated against, and continues to be discriminated against, a
policy of discrimination that favours that group – that is, affirmative action – may be
just. Though this is controversial in many actual cases of affirmative action, that is
probably on account of a lack of empirical clarity about the extent of the disadvantage
being targeted for correction, the effectiveness of affirmative action as a policy for
correcting it, and the extent of the disadvantage thereby imposed on otherwise more
advantaged groups. There are hypothetical cases where affirmative action seems
straightforwardly justified. Suppose that every member of one group, Advantaged, has
ten units of resources and ten units of welfare, and every member of another group,
Disadvantaged, has one unit of resources and one unit of welfare. Suppose further that
the members of each of the two groups have made identical choices, have identical
Lockean property rights insofar as there are any such rights (which have been violated
to Advantaged’s advantage and Disadvantaged’s disadvantage), and that in any other
regard the reader cares to consider, there is no case for Advantaged to have more re-
sources or welfare than Disadvantaged. Finally, suppose that you may legally discrim-
inate against Advantaged and in favour of Disadvantaged by allocating, say, jobs to
members of Disadvantaged in some cases where there is a better qualified member of
Advantaged. Such a measure will narrow, though not remove, the gap in resources and
welfare between individual members of Advantaged and Disadvantaged, and as it hap-
pens it will also maximize overall levels of resources and welfare. In such circum-
stances it is very hard to see any basis for refusing to engage in a policy of affirmative
action. But the disadvantage accounts of discrimination would describe such a policy
as unjust, as it will disadvantage some individuals (members of Advantaged) on dis-
criminatory grounds in both comparative and absolute terms. That is, discrimination
will make members of Advantaged worse off relative to (though not than) members of
Disadvantaged, and worse off simpliciter.
This suggests that the disadvantage accounts must be revised such that discrimina-
tion is treated as unjust not wherever it disadvantages the discriminatee, but wherever
it disadvantages the discriminatee unjustly. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2006a: 175)
notes that
[o]ne could say that an instance of discrimination is bad when it makes the
discriminatee worse off than she would have been had she not been subjected
to it. … Another possibility would be to say that an instance of discrimination
is bad when it makes the discriminatee worse off than she would have been in a
just, or the morally best, outcome.
The non-wrongfulness of at least some affirmative action shows that the more simple
former possibility is not very plausible. The latter possibility is more promising, as
there are many theories according to which affirmative action does not necessarily
make ‘the discriminatee worse off than she would have been in a just … outcome’.
This interpretation of the account may seem to render it trivial, but it does not. The
account continues to insist that disadvantaging of the discriminatee is a necessary con-
dition for unjust discrimination, and as we will see later, this is not obvious or uncon-
troversial. It just adds a further condition, which may itself be disputed (for instance,
by those opposed to affirmative action), that the disadvantaging must have made the
discriminatee worse off than justice says she should be. And how exactly we interpret
justice here adds a further level of controversy. We may, for instance, say that justice
requires equality of opportunity for welfare (Arneson 1989; but cf. Knight 2012), in
which case discrimination which makes someone worse off in a way that increases in-
equality of opportunity for welfare will be unjust (Segall 2012a). Alternatively, we
may say that justice requires that priority be given to the worst off (Parfit 1997), in
which case discrimination which makes someone worse off in a way that worsens the
condition of the worst off will be unjust (cf. Lippert-Rasmussen 2006b). Either of
these interpretations of justice is consistent with affirmative action in the kind of case
that I have suggested calls for it - affirmative action would neither further inequality of
opportunity between Advantaged and Disadvantaged, nor worsen the position of the
worst off (Disadvantaged). I will therefore treat disadvantage accounts as incorporat-
ing the condition that, for disadvantaging on the basis of discrimination to be unjust,
the disadvantaging itself must be unjust.
A final complication with advantage views should be mentioned. I initially divided
these views into comparative and absolute forms on the basis of the kind of disadvan-
taging of discriminatees with which they are concerned. However, as the best interpre-
tation of the views requires an account of justice, and accounts of justice themselves
often refer to comparative or absolute advantage, these views are best divided on the
basis of whether the account of justice appealed to is comparative or absolute. In par-
ticular, I will consider a form of comparative disadvantage account that interprets jus-
tice as equality of opportunity, and a form of absolute disadvantage account that
interprets justice as priority for the worst off.
4. Non-disadvantage accounts
There are at least two major non-disadvantage accounts of the wrongfulness of dis-
crimination. One account sees this wrongfulness where discrimination shows contempt
for, demeans, or disrespects discriminatees (Cavanagh 2002: pt. 3; Hellman 2008).6
Thomas Scanlon writes that instances of discrimination are ‘wrong … because of their
meaning – the judgment of inferiority they express and thereby help to maintain’.7 The
second non-disadvantage account says that discrimination is wrongful where it is
based on unwarranted hostility towards, or significantly prejudiced moral or empirical
beliefs about, the discriminatee.8 Richard Arneson says that ‘wrongful discrimination
occurs only when an agent treats a person identified as being of a certain type differ-
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6 Joshua Glasgow’s ‘Disrespect Analysis of racism’ implies that racist discrimination is morally wrong
on account of disrespect given his positions (1) that racism consists in racial disrespect, (2) ‘that racism
is always at least defeasibly morally condemnable’, and (3) that ‘“disrespect” itself connotes a moral
negative’ (see Glasgow 2009: 81, 77-8, 88).
7 Here Scanlon (2008: 73) says that instances of discrimination are also wrong ‘because of their conse-
quences – the exclusion of some people from important opportunities’, which suggests that he endorses
a hybrid of this account and a disadvantage account. Matthew Clayton (2012: 10-12) seems to have a
similar view.
8 Peter Vallentyne (2006: 982-83) defines ‘invidious discrimination’ as ‘the treatment of an individual
less favourably because of some feature one believes the individual to possess, where (1) the person is
not morally or prudentially responsible for having the feature in question; and (2) the treatment is based
on (a) a mistaken belief in the moral inferiority of those having the feature, (b) a significantly mistaken
empirical belief about people having the feature, or (c) hatred of those having the feature’. However,
though he thinks invidious discrimination ‘is the most despicable kind of discrimination’, his position
explicitly ‘does not view invidious discrimination as intrinsically unjust’ (Vallentyne 2006: 982, 987).
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ently than she otherwise would have done from unwarranted prejudice or animus
against persons of that type’, where prejudice involves beliefs that have been ‘formed
in some culpably defective way’ (Arneson 2006: 787, 788). Call these views, applied
to the question of why unjust discrimination is unjust, the disrespect account of the in-
justice of discrimination, and the prejudice account of the injustice of discrimination.
How do these accounts relate to advantage? Of course, any account should allow for
empirical connections between disadvantage and disrespect.9 But while disrespect may
itself disadvantage individuals in the sense of the previous section, it does not neces-
sarily do so. The question, then, is whether we should be concerned about disrespect-
ful actions per se, or with disrespectful actions that impact on their victims. On one
version of the disrespect account, which seems to be favoured by Scanlon, what makes
discrimination wrong is not the mere expression of disrespect, but its wider effects –
for instance, racial discrimination’s exclusionary effects. On another version of the
view, favoured by Deborah Hellman (2008: 6, 8), ‘to demean is to treat another in a
way that denies her equal moral worth’, and the ‘equal moral worth of all persons’ is a
‘bedrock moral principle’. Thus, to demean is wrongful ‘whether or not the person af-
fected feels demeaned, stigmatized, or harmed’ (Hellman 2008: 8, see also 27).
Yet more clearly than is the case with respect, prejudice, as something internal to the
discriminator, does not itself always disadvantage individuals. Usually the prejudice
view is construed as marking any prejudice-based discrimination as wrongful. Still,
one may take the view that what is bad about prejudice is its effects on its victims. At
any rate, on the disrespect account and the prejudice account, discrimination is unjust
not just due to its disadvantaging effects, but rather due to any disrespect or prejudice
involved in it, or the combination of these with bad effects.
However exactly they are construed, there is some intuitive plausibility to the disre-
spect and prejudice views. In the original two-person version of the coconut case,
where I give the coconut to a member of my group for discriminatory reasons and no
one else is present, there is no candidate for being subject to disrespect or prejudice.
Thus these accounts say, plausibly, that there is no injustice in that case. And this view
seems plausible also in the three-person version, as it seems likely that I disrespect and
have prejudice towards the person who receives no coconut, on account of their group
membership, and that there is injustice, as the disrespect and prejudice accounts main-
tain. Furthermore, unlike the disadvantage account, it does not need revision in order
to accommodate affirmative action. There is, I would suggest, nothing inherently dis-
respectful or prejudiced about discriminating against members of Advantaged. The
fact Advantaged is so much better off than Disadvantaged, and that we can find no
basis for justifying this, means that such discrimination can be respectful and free of
prejudice.
Larry Alexander (1992: 161) comments that ‘biases premised on the belief that some types of people are
morally worthier than others are intrinsically morally wrong because they reflect incorrect moral judg-
ments’, which suggests that he endorses a version of the view under consideration. But he also mentions
insults in many places (Alexander 1992: 162, 171, 181, 192, 193), which suggests that he may endorse a
hybrid of the two views discussed in this section.
9 ‘A psychological consequence of the systematic attachment of social disadvantage to a certain inborn
feature is that both the possessors of the feature and others begin to regard it as an essential and impor-
tant characteristic, and one which reduces the esteem in which the possessor can be held’ (Nagel 1973:
360).
5. Disadvantage accounts tested
So far, we have seen little to choose between the disadvantage and non-disadvantage
accounts. In this section I present reasons for doubting that either of the disadvantage
accounts can plausibly be the whole story about unjust discrimination, as they fail to
identify some cases of unjust discrimination.
I first consider the comparative disadvantage account, construed as the position that
discrimination which comparatively disadvantages while increasing inequality of op-
portunity is unjust. A natural way of objecting to such equal opportunity accounts of
anti-discrimination norms involves presenting examples in which there is discrimina-
tion but seemingly no inequality of opportunity. Sophia Moreau (2010: 172; see also
Lippert-Rasmussen 2012) asks us to ‘[s]uppose that a country authorized restaurants to
discriminate against clientele on the basis of religion, provided that within any particu-
lar area there were an equal number of restaurants accessible to people of any given
religion – for instance, thirty restaurants for Christians, thirty restaurants for Jews,
thirty restaurants for Muslims, and so on’. Such a scenario clearly seems to be an in-
stance of (1) discrimination (2) that is unjust and bad, and (3) that nevertheless secures
equality of opportunity.
Shlomi Segall (2012a: 82) disagrees in the course of his defence of the view that
‘[d]iscrimination is bad as such, … because and only because it undermines equality
of opportunity’. Specifically, he resists (1) and (2), claiming that this is not a situation
of discrimination, where he is using discrimination in such a way that it is necessarily
bad. To motivate this idea, he notes that Moreau-type cases involve (equally distrib-
uted) dignitary harm, and that a variation on these cases need not:
Suppose that group A is viewed as quirky and idiosyncratic by group B, but its
judgment is highly esteemed by groups C to E. And suppose that group B is
viewed as quirky and idiosyncratic by group C (the group it will end up dis-
criminating against), but highly valued by everyone else, and so forth. It might
be the case that when A discriminates against B (and B against C, and so forth)
it causes a slight reduction in B’s self-respect but an increase in C’s through
E’s self-respect (and one whose accumulated amount is larger than the decrease
in B’s) (Segall 2012a: 95).
Clearly, this situation is similar to Moreau’s, but with an overall increase
in self-respect, rather than a loss. Why might that support the idea that, in
Moreau’s case, there is no discrimination? Segall comments that in his case
[w]e have … what seems like multiple discrimination (consistent, re-
call, with equality of opportunity) which results, on the whole, in an
increase in the absolute amount of self-respect in society (or, at the
very least, no reduction in that absolute amount). Is there something
bad about this state of affairs? Perhaps there is, but if so, it does not
seem to me to be for reasons of discrimination (but if anything, to something
like social cohesion) (Segall 2012a: 95).
The idea, I take it, is that, as there is (seemingly) no discrimination in
Segall’s case, there is not any in Moreau’s case, as they are relevantly simi-
lar, and thus it is no problem that equality of opportunity recognizes no
unjust discrimination.
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I find Segall’s argument unconvincing, for two reasons. First, we might
dispute whether the two cases really are relevantly similar. The presence
of a significant loss of self-respect, which is very likely also to have nega-
tive welfare effects,10 does seem even pre-theoretically to make it more
likely that (bad) discrimination is present. Thus, even if we allow that
there is no (bad) discrimination in Segall’s case, it is still quite plausible
for us to say that there is some in Moreau’s. Second, we might dispute
whether there is really no (bad) discrimination even in Segall’s case.
Segall’s characterizes the case as one in which ‘when A discriminates against B
it causes a slight reduction in B’s self-respect’, which is obviously in my sense dis-
criminatory, but more to the point, a strong candidate for making the case one of bad
discrimination given the loss (in self-respect and presumably welfare) for B. Now it is
true that B’s loss is offset not only by gains for others, but by B’s own gains from
other acts of discrimination. But that the badness is offset by goodness does not plausi-
bly make it the case that there is not ‘something bad about this state of affairs’. Even
in Segall’s case, there seems to be discrimination that is at least pro tanto bad.
I accordingly find Segall’s defence of his equality of opportunity view of bad discrimi-
nation unsuccessful.11 But it might seem that there is some promise to an alternative
defence against Moreau’s example, which is to deny (3) that there is equality of oppor-
tunity. Among Christians, some will go to restaurants often, while others will use their
leisure time differently. If Christians are prevented from dining in some restaurants,
the restaurant-going Christians will, all else being equal, not have equal opportunities
(for welfare, for instance) with non-restaurant-going Christians (at least, assuming that
the latter do not suffer discrimination in their favoured leisure activities).
However, this response relies on individual-level differences that do not necessarily
obtain. Specifically, it relies on the discrimination affecting some good that some want
and others do not. But in some cases discrimination may regard something that every-
one wants. Suppose that, as part-time magistrates, Smith racially discriminates against
Jones, Jones racially discriminates against Brown, and Brown racially discriminates
against Smith. In each instance this is through denial of a cash award of a given size
that is assigned to members of other racial groups who present identical cases. If ev-
eryone wants the cash to the same extent, it seems that the upshot will be that there is
no inequality of opportunity. Thus, though all three individuals are disadvantaged
comparatively, this is not unjust on the equality of opportunity metric, and so there is
no unjust discrimination on the comparative disadvantage account. But notwithstand-
ing that view, there is, I submit, actually clear unjust discrimination in play here. In
particular, it seems relevant that (we can reasonably assume) there is a loss of self-re-
spect and (thus) advantage for each individual, compared to the scenario in which no-
body discriminates and simply decides the cases on their merits. I conclude, therefore,
10 Segall himself seems to assume this, given his concern with respect in this and other examples and that
he says that ‘by “equality of opportunity” I mean not equality of opportunity for a certain job or posi-
tion, but rather overall equality of opportunity (e.g. equality of opportunity for welfare)’ (Segall 2012a:
83).
11 Elsewhere Segall (2012b: 43-45) deals with a related case by introducing a separate norm of non-dis-
crimination. This does not of course offer a defence of equality of opportunity itself, far less the com-
parative disadvantage account.
that the comparative disadvantage account, construed in terms of equality of opportu-
nity, fails to capture at least some instances of unjust discrimination.
Next to be considered is the absolute disadvantage account. This obviously deals ad-
equately with cases, such as those discussed above, in which there is widely spread ab-
solute disadvantage. The problematic cases for it are those in which there is disadvan-
tage, but it falls in such a way that it is overlooked by the theory of justice the account
relies on. As I am assuming that the absolute disadvantage account appeals to an ac-
count of justice that gives priority to the worst off, we should consider cases in which
the worst off do not suffer disadvantages. Consider, for instance, a case in which an
admissions tutor at a university racially discriminates against an applicant, and in fa-
vour of an applicant who is as well off as that applicant. As the decision has no direct
bad effect on the worse off – the two applicants start equally well off – the absolute
disadvantage account only recognizes injustice here if there are disadvantaging
side-effects (for instance, a loss of self-respect that has a welfare cost for the
discriminatee). If the discriminatee is of particularly strong character and suffers no
psychological harm, the absolute disadvantage account will therefore recognize no in-
justice in the discrimination. Here it seems that the absolute disadvantage account,
construed in terms of priority for the worst off, clearly fails to identify some unjust
discrimination as unjust.
6. Non-disadvantage accounts tested
We have found that each of the disadvantage accounts overlook some instances of un-
just discrimination. Do the non-disadvantage accounts fare better?
I first consider the disrespect account, which as we have seen, comes in two forms:
one which treats disrespect that has bad effects as necessary and sufficient for unjust
discrimination, and another which treats mere disrespect as necessary and sufficient
for unjust discrimination. The main difficulty with this account, in either form, stems
from the central feature of making disrespect a necessary condition for unjust discrimi-
nation. Consider employers who refuse to employ a certain racial group, explicitly on
the ground that they consider them to be too good for the unskilled jobs they have to
offer (see Lippert-Rasmussen 2012: 69). Even though there are jobs going, they would
sooner leave them vacant. Given the rationale offered, it seems clear that this is not
disrespectful, but the effects could be catastrophic for the group concerned. Suppose,
for instance, that these views reflect the employers’ upbringings at a time when this
group was predominantly employed as artisans, in trades that have now disappeared.
This group will now be destitute as a result of the employers’ actions, which they will
not alter, being very set in their views of the dignity of the group, even when made
aware of the consequences. The absence of disrespect does not seem sufficient to pre-
vent this from being a case of unjust discrimination.
Hellman offers a response to a case in which insurers, in non-demeaning fashion,
deny medical insurance to those with genetic predispositions for disease that may
seem relevant to the above case. She claims that, in the medical insurance case, any
wrongness lies ‘not in the norm of equality but rather in a violation of the demands of
justice. This is not wrongful discrimination’ (Hellman 2008: 18). This response is
somewhat similar to Segall’s response mentioned in the previous section, in that it is
claimed that, while something bad may be at hand, it is not wrongful discrimination.
So it might be claimed that my employment example may involve wrong without be-
ing wrongful discrimination. It is unclear to me whether Hellman intends to be defend-
ing her position in the above quotation, rather than just describing it, but it is clear that
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this cannot be the basis for a successful defence of the respect account, for two rea-
sons.
First, Hellman’s ground for claiming that the denial of insurance is not wrongful dis-
crimination is that this denial does not violate the ‘bedrock moral principle’ of the
‘equal moral worth of all persons’, as it is not demeaning (Hellman 2008: 6). But this
would obviously be circular if presented as a justification of her particular account of
wrongful discrimination. If one did not accept that a necessary condition of wrongful
discrimination was the presence of demeaning acts, the absence of such acts would not
show that there was no wrongful discrimination.
Secondly, even were this possible defence not circular, it seems to rely on the denial
of medical insurance that is wrongful for reasons other than violation of the equal
moral worth of persons not being an instance of wrongful discrimination. Hellman al-
lows that the insurance case may involve wrong, so her position relies on the insurer’s
actions being non-discriminatory. Perhaps that is so in that case, as those with particu-
lar genetic predispositions may not be a group in the relevant way. But that is a feature
peculiar to that case. My example of employment denied on the basis of the appli-
cant’s race seems quite clearly to be a case of discrimination. As it is also wrongful, it
is a case of wrongful discrimination. Hellman’s response that there is no wrongful dis-
crimination in the insurance case as there is no demeaning act is only prima facie plau-
sible because she has selected a case in which there may be no discrimination. This is
exposed by cases in which there is no demeaning act, but (wrongful) discrimination is
nevertheless present.
I move on, then, to the prejudice account. Here we can be brief, as the problem is
rather similar to that with the disrespect account, and arises in the same example. None
of the employers in my example ‘treats a person identified as being of a certain type
differently than she otherwise would have done from unwarranted prejudice or animus
against persons of that type’. For obvious reasons, the employers show no animus to-
wards the racial group who they deem too good for their jobs. There is no prejudice, as
the employers’ beliefs have not been ‘formed in some culpably defective way’. Thus
on Arneson’s account, it seems there is no wrongful discrimination. There would also
be no wrongful discrimination on the possible variant of the account that I mentioned,
which requires prejudice that results in disadvantage for wrongful discrimination. As
this account just adds a further (disadvantage) condition that must be satisfied for there
to be wrongful discrimination, it too would fail to recognize wrongful discrimination
in the employment example, as its other (prejudice) condition is not satisfied. But it is,
I have suggested, quite clear that the discrimination in that case is both wrongful and
unjust.
I conclude, therefore, that the disrespect and prejudice accounts, just like the com-
parative disadvantage and absolute disadvantage accounts, each fail to identify some
instances of unjust discrimination.
7. Disadvantage accounts combined
I have argued that each of the four putative accounts of unjust discrimination return
‘false negatives’ – there are cases in which unjust discrimination is present which they
fail to recognize. The obvious conclusions to draw from this are either that some other
account altogether is required, or that the best account will be a hybrid combining two
or more of the above accounts. I do not here have space to consider the former option,
but can briefly consider the latter. At least one combination has little promise. It would
be possible to combine the two non-disadvantage accounts.12 But as these two ac-
counts were susceptible to the same example, combining them will simply compound
the problem.
This leaves as credible the combination of non-disadvantage accounts with disad-
vantage accounts, and the combination of disadvantage accounts with each other. My
view is that the latter is the most plausible hybrid.13 This allows both the sources of
unjust discrimination that the disadvantage accounts individually overlooked in sec-
tion 5 to be recognized. The absolute disadvantages that the comparative disadvantage
account overlooked in the magistrate case would be recognized by the absolute disad-
vantage account grounded in priority for the worst off, as these disadvantages would
make the worst off even worse off, and so be a basis for unjust discrimination. And the
comparative disadvantage that the absolute account overlooked in the university case
would be recognized by the comparative disadvantage account grounded in equality of
opportunity, as the candidate being denied a university place on unchosen (racial)
grounds would violate equal opportunity, and so be a basis for unjust discrimination.
A critic of this approach would point out that, in the latter case, it does not identify
the fact that racial discrimination has occurred as a special reason for saying that there
is unjust discrimination. To treat racist discrimination as just one sort of violation of
equal opportunity may seem to give it insufficient importance. Nevertheless, it can be
replied that the reason why race is a particularly inappropriate basis for differential
treatment is the fact that comparative and absolute disadvantage considerations tend to
converge in condemning such differential treatment. Differential treatment on the basis
of race is both unchosen (so such differential treatment breaches equality of opportu-
nity) and typically, on account of the disrespect it expresses, reduces absolute advan-
tage levels, especially (given the common targets of racism) those of the worst off. If
that is right, we can explain the wrong of racist discrimination purely in terms of
disadvantage.
To undermine this claim, the critic must show cases in which (1) unchosen charac-
teristics are a legitimate basis for differential treatment even though such treatment
does not promote absolute advantage levels, or (2) chosen characteristics are an illegit-
imate basis for differential treatment even though such treatment does promote abso-
lute advantage levels. I am not aware, however, of any such cases in the literature.
Larry Alexander opposes the idea ‘that basing discrimination on immutable traits such
as race or gender is what makes discrimination wrong’ on the basis of ‘the many in-
stances where discrimination based on immutable traits is not regarded as wrong (for
example, refusing to hire the blind as truck drivers), and by those instances of wrong-
ful discrimination involving mutable characteristics (for example, barring Moslems
from the basketball team)’ (Alexander 1992: 151). But refusing to hire blind truck
drivers clearly promotes absolute advantage levels (including those of the worst off),
so it is not a case where (1) unchosen characteristics are a legitimate basis for differen-
tial treatment even though such treatment does not promote absolute advantage levels.
Similarly, barring Moslems from basketball teams clearly reduces absolute advantage
levels (including those of the worst off), so it is not a case where (2) chosen character-
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istics are an illegitimate basis for differential treatment even though such treatment
does promote absolute advantage levels.14
Much more would, of course, have to be said to provide a full defence of this ac-
count. Such a defence would have to explain just how comparative and absolute con-
siderations should be brought together, and why this approach is superior to accounts
which combine disadvantage and non-disadvantage considerations.15 My purpose has
rather been to urge that, while some kind of pluralism is required, the need to bring in
non-disadvantage considerations is not as strong as it may seem. I have suggested that
one plausible approach to identifying unjust discrimination appeals to a combination
of comparative and absolute disadvantage considerations.
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